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Domestic C o n f l i c t s  arid ' P o l i t i c a l  Success  i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  and Weimar Germany: A Comparison o f  two S t u d i e s  
- - - -- .-- 
. - .  , 
T h i s ,  paper p r e i e n t s  a n d  c o n t r a s t s  t h e  methods and most s i g n i -  
f i c a n t  f i n d i n g s  o f  two q u a n t i t a t i v e  s t u d i e s  o f  domestic p o l i t i c a l  
c o n f l i c t .  Gamson uses  informat ion  from p r o f e s s i o n a l  h i s t o r i e s  i n  , 
exple- ining t h e  success  o r - . - f a i l u r e  o f  53 American p r o t e s t  organiza-  
t i o n s  i n  t h e  period 1800-1945. Wernette ' s ' a n a l y s i s  o f  v i o l e n t  and ' 
non-violent p o l i t i c a l  even t s  uses  r e p o r t s  from a  n a t i o n a l  d a i l y  
German newspaper. These even t s  occurred i n  t h e  two n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n  
campaigns i n  which t h e  Nazis gained t h e i r  g r e a t e s t  v i c t o r i e s .  The 
da ta  z.nd methods used i n  t h e  two s t u d i e s  a r e  complementary, and t h e  
f i n d i n g s  a r e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t .  Both s t u d i e s  f i n d ,  f o r  example, 
p o s i t i v e  pay-offs f o r  p o l i t i c a l  v io lence .  The paper concludes wi th  
. a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and methodological impl ica t ions  o f  
t h e  f i n d i n g s  - for. t he  s t u d y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t s .  
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The American s o c i a l  -and p o l i t i c a l  u n r e s t  o f ' t h e  l a s t  15 years  
9 
has  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  l a r g e  number of  s t u d i e s  .on  domestic, c o n f l i c t s .  - 
1 Many s t u d i e s  focused on these  American c o n f l i c t s .  Others,  i n  con- 
t r a s t ,  t r i e d  t o  provide a  g r e a t e r  pe r spec t ive  by s tudy ing  l i k e  
phenomena s p a t i a l l y  and/or temporal ly  removed from the i m ~ d i a t e  
American pas t .  One such  s t u d y  is Gamson's a n a l y s i s  o f  53 chal lenge 
2 groups i n  American h i s t o r y .  Another is. my own s t u d y  o f  - p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  two n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n  campaigns which produced 
- t h e  g r e a t e s t  g a i n s  f o r  ~ i t l e r ' s  N2zi party.3 This  paper summarizes 
and d i s c u s s e s  t h e  methods and p r i n c i p l e  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h e s e  two 
s t u d i e s .  It concludes wi th  a  d i s ~ u s ~ i o n  f  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and m t h o -  
d o l o g i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  these  s t u d i e s  f o r  t h e  s t u d y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o n f l i c t s .  
Methods and Sources o f  Data 
The u n i t  of Gamsonls s tudy,  t h e  chal lenge  group, is d i s t i n -  
- 
guished by f i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  F i r s t ,  a  cha l lenge  group is a  more 
. . o r  l e s s  formal o r g a n i z a t i o n  wi th  a  c l e a r ,  unambiguous i d e n t i t y ,  
. . 
e s t a b l i s h e d  g e n e r a l l y  through a  name. Second, a  cha l lenge  group 
- . . 
Is capable o f  t a k i n g  a c t i o n ,  such a s  demonstrat ions,  p e t i t i o n s ,  
ho ld ing  meetings, e t c .  Challenge groups t r y  t o  mobilize a n  unmobili- 
zed cons t i tuency;  t h e y  t r y  t o  c r e a t e  i n  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  t h e  
commitment t o  a c t  c o l l e c t f v e l y .  S i n c e  Gamson is not concerned with .' 
pure ly  l o c a l  c o n f l i c t s ,  a  Challenge group 's  cons t i tuency  must extend 
a c r o s s  s t a t e  l i n e s .  F i n a l l y ,  a  cha l l enge  group atte.mpts t o  change a  
s i t u a t i o n  t o  which it o b j e c t s .  TO do t h i s ,  it must inf luence  some 
o t h e r  s e t  of  I n d i v i d u a l s ,  groups, o r  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  (which 
/ .  
Gamson terms the  t a r g e t  o f  inf luence)  t o  change its decisions o r  
'. . . .  p o l i c i e s .  1n addi t ion ,  t he  t a r g e t  o f  inf luence may not be pa r t  of  
* 
' t h e  challenge group's const i tuency.  I n  r e s t r i c t i n g  the  study t o  
groups t r y i n g  t o  mobilize an unmobilized const i tuency,  Gamson ex- 
c ludes  c l e a r l y  es tab l i shed  organizat ions ,  such a s  General Motors, 
Pure ly  r e l i g i o u s  and/or u topian groups a r e  likewise excluded by 
.the s t i p u l a t i o n  t h a t  the  t a r g e t  o f  inf luence may not be pa r t  of  t he  
. . 
4 cons t i tuency ,  . . 
Having defined the  universe of  groups under study, the  next 
concern is t o  o b t a i n  a n  unbiased sample of! cha.llenge .groups fo r  
s tudy.  Through perusing the  indexes o f  American hl 's tory books, 
Gamson compiled a list of  t he  names of  organizat ions  and co l l ec t ive  
behavior  i nc iden t s  which appeared l i k e l y  t o  be challenge groups. 
From t h i s  g ross  list Gamson drew a random sample of  -467 e n t r i e s .  
, . Most e n t r i e s  f a i l e d  t o  meet one o r  more of t he  c r i t e r i a  def in ing 
chal lenge groups, and so- were excluded. O f  the  remaining 64 e n t r i e s ,  
reasonably  complete information was ava i l ab l e  f o r  53 groups. These 
53 groups, a random sample of  a l l  such groups i n  t h i s  period of 
.. American h i s t o r y ,  comprise the  data  base f o r  Gamson's study. 
A t .  l e a s t  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  p rofess iona l  h i s t o r i e s ,  supplemented 
wi th  primary sourees  when necessary, were used i n  gather ing the  
informat ion o n  each group, Biases i n  sources were duely noted, and 
c o n f l i c t i n g  r e p o r t s  were included,  i n  the  group's ' lprotocol", An ' 
i d e n t i c a l  s e r i e s  o f  quest ions  was used i n  compiling each group's 
protocol .  Th is  quest ionnaire  covered th ree  &n areas: the  cha l len ie  ' 
g ~ o u p ' s  r e l a t i o n s  and in t e r ac t ions  w.ith various i n s t i t u t i o n a l  spheres,  
such a s  t h e  law enforcement system, t he  mss media, p o l i t i c a l  pa r t i e s ,  
etc.; a t t r i b u t e s  of . t he  challenge group and its constituency, such 
a s .  t he  groupf s l eade r sh ip  s t r u c t u r e ,  ideology, t a c t i c s ,  e t c  ,; and 
the  outcome .of t he  challenge,  o r  the  degree:;:of the  group's success 
. .  J _ . . '  .:-.. . 
. , .  . i n  a t t a i n i n g  its goals  and rece iv ing  acceptance from its antagonists .  
F ina l ly ,  the  information i n  these  protocols  was' coded in to  tnachine- 
readable form, Since  most o f  these  code& measure .ca tegor ical  var iables ,  
Gamson general ly  employs Chi-square i n  h i s  ana lys i s  of the  r e l a t i on -  
s h i p s  between the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  t he  challenge groups, 
"Ca-ms~n~~ s a t ra te 'gy 'is 'to 'focus .an 'a - c e r t a i n  ktnd o f  -organha t i o n  
engaged i n  domestic c o n f l i c t s ,  Having ope ra t iona l ly  defined and 
l imi ted  the  kind o f  o rgan iza t ion  under , s tudy,  one e s t ab l i shes  a  
sampling frame, draws a-:random sample, gathers  and codes the  same 
kind of  information f o r  each organizat ion,  and proceeds with the  
arialysfs,  The research  s t r a t e g y  employed i n  my s tudy was much c lo se r  
- t o  t h a t  o f  a  case study,  Whereas Gamsonls s tudy covesed the  period 
1b0-1945, I s tud ied  the  two. two-month periods immediately preceeding 
I' 
t h e  September, 1930 and Ju ly ,  1932 German na t iona l  e lec t ions .  These 
. two campaigns were o f  i n t e r e s t  not  because they were t yp i ca l ,  but 
r a t h e r  because they  were a typ ica l ,  o f  e l e c t i o n  campaigns, For by 
s tudying these  campaigns I hoped t o  ga in  i n s igh t  i n t o  both the  r e l a -  
t ionsh ips  between v i o l e n t  and mn-violent  p o l i t i c a l  processes, and 
the .  process o f  . t h e  growth of a  f a s c i s t  par ty ,  
Having i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  time period of  i n t e r e s t ,  I located a 
r e l a t i v e l y  r e l i a b l e ,  unbiased data  source: the  newspaper ,Koelnischz 
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pei tung,  I coded a l l  a r t i c l e s  appearing i n  ' t h i s  newspaper during 
these  campaigns which repor ted p o l i t i c a l  events .  P o l i t i c a l  events  
c o n s i s t  of  one or  m r e  temporally continuous ac t ions  occurring i n  
t h e  same o r  preximate l oca t ions  i n  which ( A )  a t  l e a s t  one o f  the  
p a r t i e s  involved, (bes ides  the  po l ice ) ,  has a  c l e a r .  p o l i t i c a l  iden- 
- ,  
t i t y ,  o r  (B) t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a t  l e a s t  one o f  t h e  a c t i o n s ,  such a s  
handing o u t  e l e c t i o n  l i t e r a t u r e ,  is c l e a r l y  o f  a p o l i t i c a l  na ture ,  
. . 
Routine p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n s ,  such a s  i s s u i n g  p ress  r e l e a s e s ,  i n  which 
no l a r g e  group o f  people p a r t i c i p a t e d ,  were not included i n  the  
s tudy.  Rather ,  f o r  a n  eventli,:-- t o  be coded it had t o  'bwludey-8t i l e a a t  
one o f  t h e  fo l lowing .kinds o f  ac t ions :  non-violent,  publ ic ,  mass, 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n s  such  a s  e l e c t i o n  r a l l i e s ,  handing o u t  p o l i t i c a l  . . . . 
l i t e r a t u r e  i n  'pubric  p laces ,  demonstrat ions,  eitc .'; 'terrorist a c t s  
. . such a s  ambushes, bombings, o r  ' a t t a c k s  o n  property: c o l l e c t i v e .  
v io lence;  and a c t i o n s  by t h e  po l i ce  o r  s t a t e  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  e i t h e r  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  o r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  The d a t a  c o n s i s t s ,  then, 
o f  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  e v e n t s  i n  which e i t h e r  (A)  masses o f  ind iv idua l s  a r e  
-present;  (B) non-routine, and thus  g e n e r a l l y  v i o l e n t ,  a c t i o n s  occur;  
. o r  (c) t h e  p o l i c e  o r  s t a t e  a c t  a g a i n s t  e i t h e r  o r  both p o l i t i c a l  
- psrties o r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
Each coded even t  c o n s i s t s  o f  one o r  more a c t i o n s .  For each a c t i o n  
, .., we know t h e  type  o f  a c t i o n ,  whether o r  not one o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n i t i a t e d  
t h e  a c t i o n ,  and t h e  i d e n t i t i e s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  involved. For each event  
we a l s o  know t h e  d a t e  and place,  by c i t y  o r  township, o f  occurrence.  
Unfor tunate ly ,  t h e  newspaper provided no r e l i a b l e  e s t i m a t e s  o f  num- 
b e r s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g ,  k i l l e d , '  o r  wounded i n  t h e  even t s .  This  information 
is con.&quently not  p a r t  o f  t h e  coded records .  316 even t s  occurred i n  , 
t h e  1930 campaign. The 1932 campaign included 569 events .  Pa r t  of  .the 
..- 
a n a l y s i s  c o n s i s t s  o f  examining the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  va r ious  kinds of 
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e s e  e v e n t s  i n  the  two campaigns. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  . , 
even t s  have been aggregated ,.by d a t e ,  and by clty/township o f  occurr -  
rence .  ~ ~ g r e ~ a t i o . n / b ~  d a t e  enables  t h e  s tudy  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i e s  .of the  
i 
two campaigns. S i n c e  we have v o t i n g  r e t u r n s  by cityftownship,  aggre- 
g a t i o n  by ci ty/ township o f  t h e  even t s  makes poss ib le  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  
t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n s  between t h e s e  two kinds o f  da ta .  
The S i g n i f i c a n t  Findings o f  these  S t u d i e s  
Gamson s t u d i e s  t h e  c a r e e r s  and outcomes o f  cha l lenge  groups 
' t o  g a i n  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  openness, o r  permeabi l i ty ,  and responsive-  
n e s s  o f  t h e  American p o l i t i c a l  system.. The permeabi l i ty  of  the  system 
is measured i n  terms o f  cha l lenge  g o u p s  ga in ing  a t  l e a s t  minima-1 
acceptance a s  l e g i t i m a t e  organizat ' ions from t h e i r  an tagon i s t s .  
. . 
Responsiveness is measured i n  terms o f  groups ga in ing  new advantages,  
i . e .  a t t a i n i n g  a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  on  some o f  t h e i r  goals .  
The o u t c o m  o f  t h e  chal lenge  group 's  c a r e e r  is measured'on these 
two dimensions.  38$ o f  a l l  groups g a i n  both  new advantages and mini- 
m a l  'acceptance: 42% g a i n  ne i the r ;  and 20% g a i n  one o r  t h e  o t h e r  but 
' -  not  both.  The American p o l i t i c a l  system is c l e a r l y  n e i t h e r  completely 
- ' . responsive nor comp1ei;ely unresponsive,  n e i t h e r  completely open nor 
. . 
.~ . . - .  . . . . . . . completely c losed .  , . .  . . 
A number o f  f a c t o r s  e x p l a i n  why some chal lenge  groups g a i n  
acceptance and new advantages,  while  o t h e r s  d o n ' t .  Some groups, s ~ l c h  
a s  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  t r y i n g  t o  unseat  p o l i t i c a l  incumbants and revolu-  
t i o n a r y  groups,  a t t empt  t o  d e s t r o y  o r  d i s p l a c e  t h e i r  an tagon i s t s .  
They a r e  overwhelmingly u n s u c c e ~ s f u l ,  which sugges t s  two th ings .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  e n t r a n c e  t o  t h e  American p o l i t i c a l  system is c l e a r l y  not  
6 v i a  t h i r d  p a r t i e s .  Second, when t h e  underdog i n  a  c o n f l i c t  s t a t e s ,  
11 i t 's you o r .  me", and demands " a l l  o r  nothing",  it genera l ly  d ies .  
broke. , T h i s  does not mean, however, t h a t  t h e  ..less one demands t h e  more 
l i k e l y  one is t o  g e t  it -- Gamson f i n d s  no s i g n i f i c a n t .  d i f f e r e n c e  
between t h e  success  r a t e s  o f  groups w i t h  " l imi ted"  goa l s  and o f  groups 
.with "more t h a n  l i m i t e d  but  non-displacing" goals.7 One a d d i t i o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  0 f . a  g roup ' s  goa l s  a f f e c t s  its chances o f  success:  
. . . . groups c o n c e n t r a t i n g  t h e i r  e n e r g i e s  on a  s i n g l e  i s s u e  a r e  more 
. . s u c c e s s f u l  t h a n  groups wi th  mul t ip le- i ssue  g o a l s . .  . . . ,  . 
. . . .. . . . . . .  
~ a l n s o n  views t h e  t a s k  conf ron t ing  a  chal lenge  group a s  two- 
fo ld :  c r e a t e  suppor t  and ga the r  r e s o u r c e s  from t h e  cons t i tuency,  
and apply  t h e  r e sources  i n  a t t empt ing  t o  inf luence  the  an tagon i s t .  
. . 
Suppor t  from t h e  cons t i tuency  is not a u t o m a t i c a l l y  forthcoming, even . . - - 
w i t h  aappea4s , t o  group  solida ark-ty o r  .indi.viduaks ' -se ilf - k n t e r e s t  . 
Some chal lenge  groups use  " s e l e c t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s  ", such a s  subscr ip-  
t i o n s  t o  t h e ' g r o u p l s  magazine, o r  membership i n  l i f e  insurance plans,  
t o  g a i n  members. Such groups a r e  cons ide rab ly  more l i k e l y  t o  grow 
l a r g e  and be s u c c e s s f u l  t h a n  a r e  groups r e l y i n g  s o l e l y  on  t r a d i t i o n a l  
a p p e a l s  f o r  support .  Given suppor t  from t h e  cons t i tuency,  some groups 
a r e  more e f f i c i e n t  t h a n  o t h e r s  i n  u s i n g  t h e s e  resources .  Groups wi th  
c e n t r a l i z e d  p w s r  asd bureaucra t i c  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a r e  most i i k e i y  
t o  g a i n  acceptance and new advantages f o r  t h i s  reason. C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  
o f  power a l s o  enab les  groups t o  be more s u c c e s s f u l  i n  avoid ing  
fac t iona l i sm,  which l e s s e n s  t h e  g roup ' s  chances o f  success  'by dis-.. 
. . p r s i n g  its resources  .and ene rg ies .  
. . 
Gamson f i n d s  t h a t  some t a c t i c s  used by chal lenge  groups a r e  
c l e a r l y  more successf 'ul  t h a n  o t h e r s .  The use o f  e i t h e r  v io lence ,  'or 
c o n s t r a i n t s  such a s  s t r i k e s  o r  boyco t t s ,  i nc reases  a  group's  chance 
of success .  Likewise t h e  r e c i p i e n t s  o f  v io lence  have a below-average 
success  r a t e .  Yet' it is very  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  the  use of  
v io lence  has  a  c l e a r  e f f e c t  on t h e  success - ra te ,  independent of  o t h e r  
f a c t o r s .  For most v io lence-users  a r e  large.-groups,  and few o f  them 
use  v io lence  a s  t h e i r  c h i e f  t a c t i c .  ~ i k e w i s e  most v io lence - rec ip ien t s  
a re  smal l ,  weak groups which might w e l l  have . co l l apsed  anyway. I n  
any case ,  one t h i n g  is c l e a r :  t h e  meek may i n h e r i t  t h e  e a r t h ,  bu t  
t h e  American p o l i t i c a l  system is a  d i f f e r e n t  s t o r y .  
One f i n a l  f a c t o r  h a s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on  a  chal lenge  group's  
chances o f  success:  the kind o f  per iod i n  which it makes i ts  chal -  
lenge.  There is no s i g n i f i c a n t  long term t r e n d  i n  success  r a t e s  
from 1800 t o .  1945. Groups which a r e  a l r e a d y  e s t a b l i s h e d  and organi -  
zed o f t e n  .benef i t  from a  major c r i s i s  such . a s  a war. War-time . . . . . . : . . . . "  . -  - . . .  . . 
cha l l enges  .are e spec ia lTy  X-i.ke9.y - t~o  %win acceptance.  ,Gamson exp la ins  
P 
t h i s  i n  terms o f  p r e s s u r e s  from t h i r d  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  
I1 Although a n t a g o n i s t s  have no t  accepted t h e  cha l l eng ing  group, 
its a b i l i t y  t o  s u r v i v e  has convinced many bystanders  t h a t  t h e  
group is a  permanent f i x t u r e .  I n  n o n c r i s i s  t imes,  these  t h i r d  
p a r t i e s  do not  become involved i n  what they  see  a s  someone e l s e ' s  
q u a r r e l ,  but i n  t imes  of  c r i s i s  it is everyone I s  q u a r r e l  and 
t h e y  a r e  l e s s  t o l e r a n t .  While t h e y  do not  n e c e s s a r i l y  suppor t  
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  demands o f  t h e  cha l l eng ing  group, t h e y  a r e  l i k e l y  
t o  be a  s t r o n g  f o r c e  f o r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  This  
means t h a t  they  p ressu re  a n t a g o n i s t s  t o  bargain and nego t i a t e  
and, hence, t o  ex tend i m p l i c i t  o r  e x p l i c i b  r e c o g n i t i o n  t~ the  
cha l l eng ing  grocp. I n  m n y  cases ,  5Llt r i ~ t  a h a y s ,  the  r e s u l k a n t  
n e g o t i a t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  e v e n t u a l l y  produces new advantages.  " 8 
'I To summarize Gamsonfs main f i n d i n g s ,  t h e  chal lenge  groups most 
' l i k e l y  t o  succeed" i n  domestic c o n f l i c t s  use s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  i n  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  mobi l iz ing  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  have bureaucra t i c  organi-  
z a t i o n s  wi th  c e n t r a l i z e d  power, use  v io lence  and/or o t h e r  cons t ra in -  
i n g  t a c t i c s ,  and d o n ' t  t r y  t o  d i s p l a c e  t h e i r  an tagon i s t s .  How does 
the . - case  o f  t h e  Nazis a s  a  cha l lenge  group suppor t  o r  c o n t r a d i c t  
. : t h e s e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s ?  The Nazis used some s e l e c t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s  and 
. . 
. h a d  a  h igh ly  c e n t r a l i z e d ,  bureaucra t ized  o rgan iza t ion .  A s  we s h a l l  
s e e ,  they  a l s o  used v io lence .  I n  t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h e  Nazis were 
no t  un l ike  s u c c e s s f u l  American cha l l enge  groubs . The ~ a z i s  d i f f e r e a '  
from most s u c c e s s f u l  American c h a l l e n g e r s  i n  one important r e spec t :  
t h e y  openly t r i e d  t o  d i s p l a c e  t h e i r  a n t a g o n i s t s .  It is t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  
which makes t h e  comparison between t h e  Nazis and American chal lenge  
. groups i n t e r e s t i n g .  For such a  comparison shows t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  
as w e l l  a s  s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  between a  r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  democratic 
system, and a  p o l i t i c a l  system moving from democracy t o  f a s c i s t - . - ,  
- d i c t a t o r s h i p .  We r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  comparison a f t e r  summarizing t h e  
f i n d i n g s  f o r  t h e  two German campaigns. 
The two campaigns a r e  s i m i l a r  i n  many ' respects .  Less t h a n  a 
. f h i r d  o.f the' e v e n t s ; . i n  either:camp(li&n c o n s i s t ,  o f .  .only-'non-violent . .. :;-. . . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . 
e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  Thus both campaigns have h igh  l e v e l s  of 
v io lence .  The a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  two e x t r e m i s t  p a r t i e s  -- t h e  Nazis 
and t h e  Communists, o r  KPD -- dominate both campaigns. The Nazis a r e  
c l e a r l y  t h e  most a c t i v e  p a r t y  i n  both campaigns. Thei r  bas ic  s t r a t e g y  
i n  both campaigns is t h e  same: they  mix h igh  l e v e l s  o f  non-violent 
e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t i e s  wi th  f requent  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  v io lence .  I n  t h e  
. 1930 campaign, f o r  example, t h e  Nazis engage i n  e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t i e s  
- . 
. .- Zn 21s  of  a l l -  e v e n t s .  i n  which .they p a r t i c i p a t e .  .The. corresponding 
percent  f o r  t h e  KPD is 4$, A s  t h i s  i n d i c a t e s ,  Communist p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
is predominantly v i o l e n t ,  They i n i t i a t e  c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  wi th  
g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  frequency t h a n  do t h e  Nazis, and t h e i r  a t t a c k s  a r e  
concen t ra ted  0-n t h e  Nazis. The r e s u l t  is t h a t  a l though t h e  Nazis 
p a r t i c i p a t e  a s  f r e q u e n t l y  i n  v io lence  a s  do t h e  Communists, t h e  KPD 
. . 
appears  i n  both campaigns a s  t h e  more v i o l e n t ,  aggress ive  party.  
The comparison o f  t h e s e  two campaigns shows not  o n l y  s i m i l a r -  
$ t i e s ,  but a l s o  i n t e r e s t i n g  changes over  time. The f'requency o f  . 
e v e n t s  a lmost  doubles,  from 316 i n  t h e  1930 cam'pign t o  569 i n  t h e  
1932 campaign. Events  i n  1932 become more v i o l e n t  a s  w e l l .  Acts o f  
t e r r o r  o c c w  i n  o n l y  8$ o f  a l l  e v e n t s  i n  1930. They occur  i n  25% 
of t h e  eve'nts i n  1932. The r e l a t i v e  frequency of c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  
l i k e w i s e  more t h a n  doubles,  from 27% i n  1930 t o  57% i n  1932. Events 
. \ 
. -  . , i 
,,-- 
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i n  1932 a r e  a l s o  more concent ra ted  i n  a r e a s  o f  s t r o n g  l e f t i s t  
suppor t .  The Nazi s t r a t e g y ,  more pronounced i n  t h i s  campaign t h a n  
. - .  - - - - i n  t h e  first, is t o  conduct non-violent provocations,  such a s  r a l l i e s  
o r  marches, i n  a r e a s  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  s t r o n g  l e f t i s t  support .  
The ~ a z i s .  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  a b l e  t o  respond t o  t h e  ensuing  v i o l e n t  
a t t a c k s  wi thout  appear ing  a s  t h e  aggressor s .  An example o f  t h i s  
. - . . . .  . . . . . is . t h e  f a i r l y  t y p i c a l  event  from t h e  s t r o n g l y  l e f t i s t ,  . i n d u s t r i a l  . . .. . _ . . . . : - .  - .  . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .. 
-c i tyao f -So*tpngen wes tern  &rmany;'.'The . eve-rit accurs  -during t h e  
- .  
n i g h t  o f  ' J u l y  29-30 -- ,two days .before t h e  J u l y  31 n a t i o n a l  e l e c -  
t i o n s .  A g o u p  o f  Nazis a r e  r i d i n g  through the  Margaret s t r e e t  i n  
t h e  back o f  a n  open t ruck .  Thei r  purpose is t o  paste  up Nazi cam- 
paign p o s t e r s  i n  publ ic  p laces .  A v o l l e y  of between t h i r t y  and f o r t y  
.. . .  
. . s h o t s  a r e  aimed a t  them, a s  w e l l  a s  a  number o f  s tones  and b 6 t t l e s .  
. None o f  t h e  Nazis a r e  h i t ,  however. The r e i n f o r c e d  r i o t  pol ice  a r e  
u m b l e  t o  f i n e  t h e  s n i p e r s .  9 
. The combination o f  e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t i e s  wi th  p o l i t i c a l  v io lence  
i n  t h e  So l ingen  even t  is not a t y p i c a l ;  roughly 50% o f  a l l  cases  o f  
c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  i n  1930 occur  i n  t h e  con tex t  of  e l e c t o r a l  a c t i -  
v i t i e s .  The corresponding percentage f o r  t h e  1932 campaign is con- 
s i d e r a b l y  lower, which is p r imar i ly  due t o  t h e  lower o v e r - a l l  f r e -  
quency of  e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v . i t i e s  i n  t h e  second campaign. These f ind ings  
sugges t  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  v io lence  is c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  process o f  
' p o l i t i c a l  mobi l i za t ion  i n  t h e s e  campaigns. A t  i s s u e  i n  many o f  t h e s e  
c o n f l i c t  even t s  is t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  dominant p a r t y ' s  near monopoly 
o n  t h e  r i g h t  t o  use  pub l i c  p laces  i n  i ts area ,  o f  suppor t  f o r  po l i -  
t i c a l  mobil izat ion.  By cha l l eng ing  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  publ ic  p laces  
. . 
i n  l e f t i s t  a r e a s ,  t h e  Nazis a t t empt  t o  both mobilize suppor t  f o r  
themselves, and demobilize t h e i r  enemies a t  t h e  same time. I n  some 
- ways t h i s  was a  foolproof  s t r a t e g y .  I f  t h e i r  provocat ion was m e t  
- .  
. . . with a  v i o l e n t  l e f t i s t  a t t a c k ,  t h e y  could appear  a s  t h e  m i l i t a n t  
. . 
foes o f  t h e  Communist menace wi thout  appear ing  a s  t h e  a c t u a l  aggres- 
sors. Should no such response  m a t e r i a l i z e ,  t h e  l e f t i s t  would l o s e  
f a c e  .and t h e  Nazis would have a  new, previous ly  unava i l ab le  resource: 
t h e  r i g h t  t o  use pub l i c  p laces  i n  l e f t i s t  a r e a s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  mbi l i -  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . 4 .  ; '. - : . . . . .  . . . . . - . . . . . .  ...::,.. ..... I . .  - a.  .:--;..  . . .  .......:.... . .  . . . .  ..... ............ f . ,:'. ::,:. .:: ' .... : .*. .: ..,,. .... ..: -. . ' , . .  * '  .,-?.;..* .-. _ . . i .... ::.. _ ._. . .. 1-.. _ . .  . . . . . . . .  - - 2. . . . .  z a t i o n .  - . . _  . . . . 
The above argument sugges t s  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  v io lence  a r i s e s  from 
t h e  process  o f  p o l i t i c a l  mobil izat ion.  Addi t iona l  suppor t  f o r  t h i s  
comes from t h e '  f i n d i n g s  c o r r e l a t i n g  v a r i o u s  kinds o f  a c t i v i t i e s  with 
changes i n  t h e  l lazi  and KPD vo tes  i n  t h e s e  two e l e c t i o n s .  Both the  
, , Nazis  and t h e  Communists g a i n  l a r g e  numbers o f  v o t e s  i n  these  e- lsc-  A 
t - i o w ;  al though t n e  Nazi g a i n s  a r e  t h e  greatest. The ga ins  f o r  both 
parties, i n  both campaigns, a r e  above average i n  a r e a s  exper iencing  
high l e v e l s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  The zero-order c o r r e l a t i o n s  
between increased  v o t e s  and p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  h igher  f o r  t h e  
KPD v o t e s  t h a n  f o r ' t h e  Nazi votes .  The c o r r e l a t i o n s  f o r  both p a r t i e s  
are g e n e r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  o r  beyond t h e  .O5 l e v e l .  Th i s  does not  
n e c e s s a r i l y  mean t h a t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  p o l i t i c a l  v io lence  caused t h e  
Nazi o r  KPD gains .  Whether t h e s e  a r e  spur ious  c o r r e l a t i o n s  w i l l  be 
determined o n l y  a f t e r  ' t h e  completion o f  mul t ip le  l i n e a r  re 'gression 
a n a l y s i s .  One t h i n g  is c l e a r ,  however: t h e  process  of p o l i t i c a l  con- 
f l i c t  and v io lence  is a t  l e a s t  geographica l ly  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  process 
o f  e x t r e m i s t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  mobi l iza t ion .  
Z 
One might argue t h a t  comparisons between p o l i t i c a l  movements . 
and c o n f l i c t s  i n  Weimar Germany and t h e  U.S . - a r e  i n v a l i d .  Germany 
i n  t h i s  per iod had a  par l iamentary  system based on  p ropor t iona l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  . i n  which o v e r .  a  dozen p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  competed. 
- The chances f o r  growth and succ.ess f o r  a  smal l ,  e x t r e m i s t  pa r ty  
a r e  , c l e a r l y ;  b e t t e r  i n  such i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c i rcumstances t h a n  i n  t h e  
. .  - . . .  . . 
. . 
-, . 
& r e  s t a b l e  American two-party system. I have no.: doubt t h a t .  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t t i n g s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  exp la in ing  
why a  f a s c i s t  movement succeeded i n  Germany and not  i n  t h e  U . S .  
Such d i f f e r e n c e s ,  however, do not i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  comparisons, 
. .. . . - -'.:;' . , .:* . - . . - :but r a t h e r .  o n l y .  1.imit-. t h e  :genera. . l . ization~ :which.- &an:be:made'. from . ". 
. . . . 
such comparisons. 
The s a w  depress ion  which gave t h e  Nazis a n  upsurge i n  v o t e r  
suppor t  produced a  s i g n i f i c a n t  number o f  ~ m e r i c a n  chal lenge  groups 
\ 
wi th  t h e  s i m i l a r  goa l  o f  d i s p l a c i n g  t h e  s n t a g o n i s t .  One such group, 
included i n  Gamsonts sample, was t h e  American equ iva len t  o f  t h e  
Nazis: t h e  German-American Bund. Nor. was t h i s  t h e  on ly  group wi th  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  t o  t h e  Nazis; Gamson's sample a l s o  included Father  
c o u g h l i n t s  C h r i s t i a n  Front '  a g a i n s t  Communism. How does one e x p l a i n  
t h e  Nazi s u c c e s s ~ i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  s i m i l a r  groups i n  
America. Let us  first r e j e c t  one e x p l a n a t i o n  i m p l i c i t  i n  many h i s -  
t o r i e s :  t h i s  is n o t  p r i m a r i l y  due t o  H i t l e r t s  cha r i smat i c  p e r s o n a l i t y  
o r  s u p e r i o r  r h e t o r i c a l  s k i l l s  -- Fa the r  Coughlin, a f t e r  a l l ,  was no 
mean demagogue. The ana lyses  reviewed above sugges t ,  r a t h e r ,  t h e  
importance o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process and o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  exp la in ing .  success  o r  f a i l u r e .  
The a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  two e l e c t i o n  campaigns po in t s  t o  t h e  impor- 
t ance  of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  in- 
c r e a s e s  i n  Nazi support .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h i s  5 n a l y s i s  po in t s  t o  . 
t h e  importance o f  t h e  e x i s t a n c e  of  a  r a d i c a l l y  m i l i t a n t  Nazi countep- 
p a r t ,  a b l e  t o  p l a y  a  c r e d i b l e  r o l e  i n  t h e  p o l a r i z a t i o n  process,  and 
o f  t h e  Nazi s t r a t e g y  o f  mi l i tan t lyeprovacat ive  p o l i t i c a l  mobil izat ion.  
. From t h e  German and I t a l i a n  cases ,  one might assume t h a t  a  s t rong ,  
, m i l i t a n t ,  and p o l i t i c a l l y - o r g a n i z e d  working c l a s s  is a  prerequi-  
. . 
. .  . 
s i t e  t o  t h e  r i s e  o f  a f a s c i s t  movement, Given t h i s  assumption, 
previous r e p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  l e f t  and i n c l u s i o n  o f  working-class . . 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  t h e  Mew Deal c o a l i t i o n  may have prevented t h e  
r i s e  o f  a  massive f a s c i s t  movement, Th i s  may have opera ted  by  
could have a c t e d  a s  a p o l a r i z a t i o n  p a r t n e r  t o  a n  American v e r s i o n  
o f  H i t l e r ' s  Nazi p a r t y ,  I n  any case ,  t h e  l a c k  o f  such- a  p o l i t i c a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  deprived American f a s c i s t  movements o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  
t o  be accrued from t h e  kind of provacat ive  p o l i t i c a l  mobi l iza t ion  
. used by t h e  Nazis i n  Germany. 
-. . 
The above e x p l a n a t i o n  r e s t s  on t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  process 
' producing a  f a s c i s t  v i c t o r y  is i n  some way s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
. # . . . . . . . . 
I .  f r c i m  " n o ~ m a l "  d e w c r a t i c  prbbesses'.  his may be t h e  :case, but   am son's 
f i n d i n g s  poin t  t o  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  why t h e  Nazis succeeded 
/O 
while  t h e i r  American c o u n t e r p a r t s  f a i l e d .  A s  noted above, t h e  Nazis'  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  f i t  t h o s e  o f  a n  "idea 1 - t y p i c a l "  s u c c e s s f u l  American 
chal lenge  group i n  a l l  bu t  one respec t :  t h e  Nazis wanted t o  d i s p l a c e  
t h e i r  a n t a g o n i s t s .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  Cough l in t s  CFAC - n e i t h e r  used s e l e c -  
t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s  nor had a  bureaucra t ized  o rgan iza t ion .  Given such 
. . handicaps,  it is no wonder t h a t  Coughlin f a i l e d  whi le  H i t l e r  suc- - 
ceeded. Th i s  type  o f  e x p l a n a t i o n  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  no b a s i c  d i f f e r e n c e  
e x i s t s  between p o l i t i c s  procuding a  f a s c i s t  d i c t a t o r s h i p ,  and more 
r o u t i n e  p o l i t i c a l  processes .  The answer, r a t h e r ,  lies i n ' t h e  capa- 
b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  c h a l l e n g e r  t o  mobilize its cons t i tuency  and e f f e c t i v e l y  
app ly  r e s o u r c e s  t o  t h e  t a r g e t ( s 1  .of  in f luence .  Needless t o  say,  
. . 
t h e s e  types  of a n a l y s i s  complement, r a t h e r  t h a n  compete with,  each 
. i' / 
o t h e r .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between changing o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  
and. p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r a c t i o n s  is a l s o  worthy-. o f  f u t u r e  s tudy,  I n  . . 
.. .': . any c a s e ,  o u r  p resen t  f indings '  b r i n g  u s  t h i s  f a r  and no f a r t h e r ,  . , *  . 
. . 
I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  Study o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f l i c t s  
I s e e  f o u r  main impl ica t ions  f o r  t h e  s t u d y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  0 
c o n f l i c t s  from t h e s e  two s t u d i e s .  The.. first concerns t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  
: :  . o f  .the.. behav io r  o f  p a r t  cis: to k o d f l i c t s  .' ~ o t h  .$ti tdies i m p l i c i t l y '  
assume t h a t  t h e  explanatory  power of  i r r a t i o n a l i t y  i n  p o l i t i c a l  . .  . 
outcomes is n e g l i g i b l e .  Rather ,  t o  understand t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  a  pa r ty  
t o  a  c o n f l i c t ,  one should look a t  t h e  p a r t y ' s  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  po l i -  
t i c a l  system, its goa l s ,  i ts resources ,  and t h e  o p t i o n s  o w n  t o  it. 
* - To t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which something analogous t o  a  " p o l i t y "  e x i s t s  i n  5.  
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a rena ,  one might view var ious  " n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  
. . f r o n t s "  a s  analogous t o  chal lenge  groups. An i n t e r e s t i n g  hypothesis  
. -  . -. . 
, 
. from t h i s  l i n e  o f  thought  would be t h a t  t h e  use o f  t e r r o r  by such . .. . 
. . 
. ... - 3' 
groups a s  t h e  P.L.O. is due i n  l a r g e  p a r t  t o  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  vis-a-  
v i s  t h i s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t y .  Such a s t u d y  would show, among o t h e r  
t h i n g s ,  how a  p a r t y ' s  p o s i t i o n  o u t s i d e  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t y  
a f f e c t s  its op t ions ,  r e sources ,  and t h e  in f luences  o n  its goals .  . . 
A second i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  is t h a t  t h e  primary base 
of p o l i t i c a l  power is i n  t h e  suppor t  and resources  g iven  by a  con- 
s t i t u e n c y .  Nei ther  s t u d y  assumes t h a t  power is a n  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  
s c a r c e  r e source  i n  a  world o f  power-hungry groups. Likewise, t h e  . 
s p r e a d  of suppor t  f o r : . p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s  is not  s e e n  a s  s o l e l y  a  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h e  pub l i c  r e l a t i o n s  s k i l l s  o f  t h e  indiv idGals  advocat ing them. ' . 
Rather ,  i s s u e s  and g o a l s  a r e  a t  l e a s t  somewhat r e l a t e d  t o  the. con- 
s t i t u e n c y ' s  s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic p o s i t i o n s  and h i s t o r i c a l  
exper i ences .  A t h i r d ,  i m p l i c a t i o n  fo l lows from t h i s :  t o  understand t h e  
flows o f  suppor t  and resources  i n  an. i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t ,  r e l a t e  
. . . .  - : 
' - .  . . . 
. . 
..*<.. 
. - t h e  a c t i o n s  :of t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  understandings 
- . . . .  ......, . . . . .  . . . . . . .  ......... 
., 1. -. <. . ' " - - . ': . : of t h e s e  i s s u e s .  For , t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c t o r s  a r e  
l i k e  chal lenge  groups, a c t i o n s  a r e  chosen not  on ly  with a n  eye t o  
. . .  
t h e  a n t a g o n i s t ' s  response,  bu t  a l s o  w i t h  t h e  f u t u r e  sGpwrt o f  t h e .  , 
cons t i tuency  i n  mind. 
t h e  f ind ings  sugges t  t h a t  a  number o f  d i f f e r e n t  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t  the  
. . 
outcomes o f  domestic c o n f l i c t s .  The p a r t y ' s  a b i l i t i e s  t o  mobilize 
and e f f e c t i v e l y  use suppor t  fYom its cons t i tuency ,  and t h e  na ture  o f  
t h e  p a r t y ' s  goa l s ,  t a c t i c s ' ,  and i n t e r a c t i o n s  wi th  its an tagon i s t s  -- 
a l l  appear , to  have some r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  f i n a l  outcome o f  t h e  domes- 
. . .  . . . .  
8 .  - ... 
t i c  c o n f l i c t .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  these.  domestic c o n f l i c t s  a r e  s i m i -  
l a r  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t s ,  t h e  s t u d e n t  o f  , , the l a t t e r  ignores  
. . . . 
+ any of t h e i e  f a c t o r s  at  h i s  o'r' h e r  own r i s k .  
. . 
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o f  groups under s tudy .  Only groups whose members-are e i t h e r  
. 
- American c i t i z e n s  o r  a r e  s t r i v i n g  t o  become such a r e  s t u d i e d .  
Groups a t t e ~ p t i n g  t o  m S i l i z e  only  o t h e r  groups a r e  excluded 
from t h e  s tudy ,  a s  a r e  s p l i n t e r s  o f  groups which l a c k  an  inde- 
. . pendent o p e r a t i n g  s t r u c t u r e ,  and s a t e l l i t e s  o f  o t h e r  .grou.ps. 
For f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  and d i scuss ion ,  s e e  W m .  Gamson, op. a., 
pp. 17-18. 
5. For f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  on t h e  ga the r ing  and manipulation o f  t h i s  d a t a ,  
s e e  Dee Wernette,  qp. s., Ch.  3 and Appendix 1. 
6. This  is  not t o  sugges t ,  however, t h a t  s u c c e s s f u l  cha l lenge  groups 
avoid the  e l e c t o r a l  system l i k e  t h e  p l ~ g u e .  To t h e  con t ra ry ,  
Garson notes  ( p .  151) t h z t  52% o f  t h e  e l e c t c r a l  cha l l engers  
' ..?::- gai,ned ~ e w  advantages,  and 385 of .  such groups gained acceptance.  
S ince  a l l  o f  t h e  t h i r d - p a r t y  cha l l enges  f a i l e d ,  t h e s e  success-  ' - 
ful groups used t h e  e l e c t o r a l  system i n  o t h e r  ways. 
7. Groups wi th  " l imi ted"  goa l s  a t tempt  t o  change o n l y  t h e  con ten t  o f  
11 some s ' p e c i f i c  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  a n t a g o n i s t ( s ) .  Groups wi th  m r e . -  
t h a n  l i m i t e d  but  non-displacing" goa l s  a t tempt  t o  a l t e r  a t  
l e a s t  one, . i f  not  more, of  t h e  following: t h e  a n t a g o n i s t ' s  
scope o f  a u t h o r i t  ; t h e  a n t a g o n i s t ' s  personnel; o r  t h e  antagon- 
ist 's procedure(s  . This  d i s c u s s i o n  summarizes s o r e  o f  the  
. . - f ind ings  from Gamsonfs 3 Ch. 4 .  Gamsonls d i scuss ions  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  s e l e c t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s ,  v io lence  and o t h e r  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  and 
o f  bureaucracy and c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  power a r e  found. i n  Chapters 
- 5-7. . . 
8. Wm. A Gamson, w. G., p. 318. 
9. Foelnische Zeitunq, cologne,  Germany, J u l y  30, 1932, E d i t i o n  No. . 
412. The t r a n s l a t i o n  is my own. 
10. Gamson does r o t  address  t h i s  ques t ion .  Rather ,  I am us ing  h i s  
f ind ings  t o  sugges t  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  explanat ion .  This  exp lana t ion  
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